Havana has every reason to raise a glass. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s electoral victory in Brazil promises continuity in the cordial relationship between Brasília and the Cuban government. Miguel Díaz-Canel was quick to congratulate his Brazilian “brother”, celebrating a political affinity that has survived changes of government, shifting alliances and the passage of time. Yet behind the revolutionary embraces lies a rather less romantic reality: Cuba needs food, Brazil sells it, and political slogans remain remarkably ineffective at filling an empty saucepan.
The Cuban economist Elías Amor, interviewed by Martí Noticias, described Lula’s victory as a “cushion” for the Cuban government. It is an appealing metaphor, although cushions have their limitations. They may soften a fall, but they do little to prevent the next one. When an economy increasingly depends on foreign suppliers for essential goods, the issue ceases to be merely ideological. It becomes a question of productive capacity, economic management and, ultimately, administrative survival.
Brazil’s official trade figures for 2024 offer a particularly revealing picture. According to COMEX STAT, maintained by Brazil’s Ministry of Development, Industry, Trade and Services, Brazilian exports to Cuba amounted to approximately US$276.8 million, while Cuban exports to Brazil reached barely US$2.9 million. The resulting Brazilian trade surplus stood at roughly US$273.9 million. Such an imbalance is not, in itself, evidence of wrongdoing. It does, however, illustrate a commercial relationship in which one country sells substantially more than the other can offer in return.
But the truly remarkable item on Brazil’s export list is sugar. Yes, sugar. In 2024, Brazil sold Cuba approximately US$31.8 million worth of the commodity. A country whose plantations, mills and sugar exports once helped define its economic identity now turns to foreign producers for supplies. This is more than a curious entry in a customs ledger. It is a historical irony worthy of a prominent exhibit in any museum devoted to the failures of economic planning.
The paradox deserves a moment’s silence, followed perhaps by a few bars of cha-cha-cha. Cuba has not lost its tropical climate, its agricultural land or the accumulated knowledge of generations of sugar workers. What has deteriorated is the productive system: ageing machinery, inadequate investment, failing infrastructure, inefficient management and decades of centralised decision-making. American sanctions impose genuine constraints, particularly on finance and international transactions. But attributing the entire collapse of Cuba’s sugar industry to those sanctions would be rather like blaming the thermometer for the fever.
Nor does the problem end with sugar. Brazil supplies poultry, rice, soya oil and other essential foodstuffs to Cuba. These imports matter enormously to a population struggling with persistent shortages. Yet an important distinction must be maintained: selling food to another country is not necessarily the same as financing its government. Establishing whether particular transactions involve credit, subsidies or unpaid obligations requires contracts, payment terms, loan records and evidence of outstanding balances. Without such documentation, commercial exports cannot responsibly be presented as political gifts.
Brazil and Cuba do, nevertheless, have a financial history that warrants scrutiny. Brazil’s National Bank for Economic and Social Development, BNDES, has acknowledged earlier export-financing arrangements involving Cuba and outstanding historical obligations. Those records, however, do not establish that the food exports recorded in 2024 were directly financed by Lula’s administration or that the corresponding invoices remain unpaid. Amor raises a legitimate question about Havana’s ability to meet its commitments. But a question, however reasonable, is not proof. Even among revolutionary comrades, invoices retain the inconvenient habit of carrying payment deadlines.
The American embargo also deserves a more serious examination than political slogans usually permit. Cuba’s ability to trade with Brazil demonstrates that the island is not entirely excluded from international commerce. It does not demonstrate that American sanctions have no consequences for financial transactions, borrowing costs or access to international markets. Both realities can exist simultaneously. To blame every economic failure on the embargo is intellectually lazy; to dismiss its effects simply because a Brazilian vessel can unload cargo in Havana is no more convincing.
Lula’s re-election therefore promises diplomatic continuity, but it cannot answer the central question: how long can an economy remain dependent on foreign suppliers for goods it once produced in abundance? Díaz-Canel speaks of Latin American unity and regional integration. These are attractive ambitions, particularly when expressed from the comfort of a presidential office. Genuine integration, however, ought also to be measured by productive capacity, commercial reliability, the ability to honour obligations and improvements in ordinary people’s lives.
And so, while Brazil celebrates its election and Havana offers its congratulations, history delivers another of its exquisitely uncomfortable jokes. On an island where sugar once nourished fortunes, revolutions and songs, part of the sugar now arrives from Brazil. Lula can offer friendship, trade and diplomatic support. What he cannot offer is a miraculous cure for Cuba’s structural economic weaknesses. The cha-cha-cha may have three steps, but a functioning economy requires rather more: producing, managing, investing and paying. And, preferably, ensuring that when the music stops, there is still something left on the table.
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Sources consulted: Martí Noticias / Radio Martí, reporting by Rolando Nápoles and statements by economist Elías Amor; Brazil’s Ministry of Development, Industry, Trade and Services (MDIC), COMEX STAT trade statistics for 2024; Brazilian Embassy in Havana, commercial documentation dated November 2025; World Bank and UN Comtrade trade statistics; BNDES public information on export financing and outstanding obligations involving Cuba.